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NOTE
EXTENDING UNITED STATES V. MENDOZA: WHY
DEFENSIVE NONMUTUAL ISSUE PRECLUSION IS
UNAVAILABLE AGAINST THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
Jake E. Goodmant
Imagine a situation where the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) is Looking to enforce the antifraud
provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against wo
different companies, arising out of the same transaction. Now
suppose the SEC sues Company A ftrst. However, the court
finds no violation based on the factual determinations of the
transaction and renders a judgment refusing to impose liabil-
ity against Company A. Unsatisfied, the SEC decides to sue
Company B under the same provision. Company B, however,
believes the factual issues were already litigated and deter-
mined against Company A and wants to preclude relitigation
by simply applying the previous factual determinations to the
current case. Can they do so? This legal mechanism is classi-
fied as defensive nonmutual issue preclusion.1 The United
States Supreme Court has not addressed whether this mecha-
nism is available against he federal government.
This Note examines the use of defensive nonmutual issue
preclusion against he federal goverriment-the basic question
being whether the doctrine is available. In United States v.
Mendoza, the Supreme Court announced that offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion was unavailable against the federal
government.2 The policy interests announced in Mendoza sup-
port expanding that exception to the defensive context.
t B.A., Temple University, 2015; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2020; Notes Edi-
tor, Comell Law Review, Vol. 105. I would like to thank Professor Zachary Clopton
for his unwavering support-in both his advice for this Note and his mentorship
as I begin my legal career. To George El-Khoury: thank you for supporting me
throughout my journey and navigating the complex world of issue preclusion for
this Note. Special thanks to the entire staff of Comell Law Review for your indefat-
igable effort and vital contributions. Finally, to my parents: thank you for every-
thing-I could not be here without you two.
1 See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 551, Westlaw (database updated August
2019).
2 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 164 (1984).
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The Introduction will explain the pertinent terminology
and set forth nonmutual issue preclusion's doctrinal develop-
ment. Part I will provide a detailed analysis of how the law
currently stands. Part II will analyze the current legal frame-
work and argue that defensive nonmutual issue preclusion is
likely unavailable against he federal government. Primarily,
this extension flows from the policy arguments postulated in
United States v. Mendoza.
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Res judicata principles entail a relationship between sepa-
rate legal actions. In practice, the doctrine effectuates the
preclusive effects of prior adjudications. From a macro level,
res judicata entails two distinct legal doctrines: claim preclu-
sion and issue preclusion.3 Claim preclusion merges a judg-
ment into the claim and that claim-or cause of action-is
henceforth barred from relitigation.4 Once the judgment is ren-
dered, "[it is] the full measure of relief to be accorded between
the same parties on the same 'claim' or 'cause of action."'5
Claim preclusion's aim is to avoid repetitive litigation between
the same parties on the same claim. The second doctrine, is-
sue preclusion, operates differently. Issue preclusion recog-
3 See 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4402 (3d ed. 1998) ("Although the time has not yet come when courts
can be forced into a single vocabulary, substantial progress has been made to-
ward a convention that the broad 'res judicata' phrase refers to the distinctive
effects of a judgment separately characterized as 'claim preclusion' and 'issue
preclusion.'").
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nizes that a claim in one suit may present relevant issues to a
claim in another suit. To effectuate its public policy goal of
reducing repetitive litigation, issue preclusion "bars the reliti-
gation of issues actually adjudicated, and essential to the judg-
ment, in a prior litigation between the same parties."6
According to the Second Restatement of Judgments, issue
preclusion is defined as "an issue of fact or law [that] is actually
litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, [such that] the de-
termination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the
parties, whether on the same or a different claim."7 Notably,
this concept extends to new parties, too. When issue preclu-
sion extends to new parties (i.e., parties absent from the previ-
ous lawsuit)," the legal designation is "nonmutual." In the SEC
example, Company B is considered nonmutual. The law makes
a further distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" uses.
Offensive nonmutual issue preclusion9 allows a new plaintiff in
a subsequent lawsuit to use a prior judgment against a former-
party litigant.' 0 Alternatively, defensive nonmutual issue pre-
clusionI' allows a new defendant in a subsequent lawsuit to
use a prior judgment against a former-party litigant. 12 Under
our example, Company B is applying defensive nonmutual is-
sue preclusion.
B. Doctrinal Development
As a practical matter, res judicata "presents a particularly
delicate balance between the values of clear theory and the
need for pragmatic adjustment."13 While "[clear rules are im-
portant if a dispute is to be settled by a single litigation,"'4 res
judicata operates with less clarity than it strives to produce.
The analytical argument to bar litigation through res judicata
6 Id. at 535-36.
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: FORMER ADJUDICATION § 27 (AM. LAW
INST. 1982).
8 A party in privity is often considered mutual. If a court determines that a
current party is in privity to a previous party, issue preclusion may apply against
the current party. See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4463.
9 In symbolic form, the two suits look as follows: (Suit 1) P1 sues D, and D
loses on issue 1; (Suit 2) P2 sues D, and P2 asserts the judgment from issue 1 in
suit 1 against D.
10 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464.
11 The symbolic relationship: (Suit 1) P sues D I, and P loses on issue 1; (Suit
2) P sues D2, and D2 asserts the judgment from issue 1 in suit 1 against P.
12 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464.
13 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4401.
14 Id.
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retains space for distinct legal and analytical theories15 which,
in turn, can independently generate preclusive outcomes.'6 As
a corollary, preclusion often raises complex consequences on
litigation strategies that flow as undercurrents throughout ad-
judicative proceedings.'7
However, the doctrinal origins of issue preclusion were
more symmetrical than the nonmutual doctrine suggests. The
original doctrine of mutuality held that a party may not benefit
from a prior judgment unless they would have been bound by
any unfavorable effects.' Historically, because unfavorable
judgments never bound nonparties (without privity), they could
never benefit. In the context of our example: because an unfa-
vorable judgment against Company A could never bind Com-
pany B-as a nonparty-Company B could never benefit,
unless in privity. This concept was markedly influential. The
Supreme Court of the United States once detailed that it is "a
principle of general elementary law that the [preclusion] of a
judgment must be mutual."'9 Eventually, the requirement for
1s See, e.g., Developments in the Law Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 840
(1952) ("[Issue preclusion] is that aspect of res judicata concerned with the effect
of a final judgment on subsequent litigation of a different cause of action involving
some of the same issues determined in the initial action." (footnote omitted)); id. at
824 ("[Under res judicata/claim preclusion], [1]f a plaintiff brings an action that
proceeds to final judgment, his 'cause of action' is said to be 'merged' in the
judgment if he wins or 'barred' by it if he loses. This means that what was
considered or should have been considered in the first action cannot form the
basis of a subsequent action." (footnote omitted)).
16 See 18 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4406 ("As useful as the distinction
between issue and claim preclusion may be, it is important to note that the
distinction is not complete. Foreclosure of an issue by prior litigation may often
extend beyond the supporting arguments actually made to preclude new argu-
ments that never were made. The distinction is one of emphasis and degree, no
more." (footnote omitted)).
17 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 945, 950-51 (1998) ("Under [a mutuality regime], a rational litigant will
consider only the stakes between the current parties, either in the immediate
lawsuit or in foreseeable further lawsuits between the same parties. By contrast,
when nonmutual issue preclusion is allowed, a rational litigant will consider the
stakes not only between the current parties, but also the stakes in foreseeable
lawsuits with others. Thus, wherever a litigant can foresee related litigation with
nonparties, nonmutual issue preclusion produces incentives to invest greater
resources into winning in order to prevent adverse determinations that may carry
a damaging issue-preclusive effect in subsequent suits.").
18 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4463 ("For many years, most
courts followed the general rule that the favorable preclusion effects of a judgment
were available only to a person who would have been bound by any unfavorable
preclusion effects.").
19 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining &Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912).
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mutuality was abandoned,20 and a slew of cases marked its
doctrinal erosion beginning in the Supreme Court of California
in 1942.21
In Bernhard v. Bank of America, Justice Roger J. Traynor
rendered a decision that amounted to an unqualified rejection
of the mutuality doctrine. In part, he stated, "[tlhere is no
compelling reason ... for requiring that the party asserting the
plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a
party, to the earlier litigation."22 Departing from previous ca-
non, Bernhard permitted a defensive use of issue preclusion by
a nonparty.23
Justice Traynor believed that the mutuality doctrine was
not aligned with the policy justifications of res judicata, argu-
ing that "[tihe rule is based upon the sound public policy of
limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair
trial on an issue from against drawing it into controversy."2 4
Justice Traynor's concise opinion ended with three central
questions to determine the validity of using nonmutual issue
preclusion in a given context: whether the issues in each case
were identical, whether the final judgment was on the merits,
and whether the party against whom the plea was asserted was
a party or privy to the prior adjudication. Over the years, the
idea that prior parties needed a full and fair opportunity to
litigate in former adjudications developed as an adjunct
requirement.25
About three decades later, in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories
v. University of Illinois Foundation, the United States Supreme
Court announced a major departure from the mutuality re-
quirement.26 Contextually, the case involved patent litigation,
but Blonder-Tongue is doctrinally interpreted as authorizing
the defensive use of nonmutual issue preclusion more gener-
20 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464 ("[The] traditional rule [of
mutuality] has been abandoned as to issue preclusion by federal courts and a
continually increasing majority of state courts.").
21 See Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Tr. & Say. Ass'n., 122 P.2d 892, 893
(1942).
22 Id. at 894.
23 In the first proceeding, a probate court determined that the decedent made
a lifetime gift of her savings account to the executor. In the second lawsuit, an
objector sued the bank to recover the money, arguing that the decedent had never
authorized to executor to withdraw it. The court permitted the bank to use the
probate judgment to preclude relitigation on the issue of who owned the money.
Notably, the bank would not have been bound by the probate court's determina-
tion in the first suit.
24 Berfhard, 122 P.2d at 894.
25 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464.
26 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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ally.27 Portions of the Court's opinion justify a generalized
application. In particular, the Court noted Bernhard's "signifi-
cant impact," while addressing the growing criticisms of mutu-
ality and acknowledging the trend in federal courts to reject
it.2 8
The Court in Blonder-Tongue addressed fairness concerns
by qualifying the doctrine for instances where a defendant is
invoking preclusion against a former-party plaintiff- the pre-
sumption being that the plaintiff already had his choice of time
and place for the prior litigation.29 Ultimately, however, pre-
clusion depends on whether the parties in the first suit were
awarded a "full and fair opportunity to litigate."3 0 Despite a
mix of patent-specific and generalized reasoning, the post-
Blonder-Tongue message was clear: defensive nonmutual issue
preclusion was an acceptable doctrine.
The doctrinal development took yet another significant
turn in 1979. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,3 1 the Court
addressed the idea of using offensive nonmutual issue preclu-
sion.32 The Court concluded that the "preferable approach for
dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to pre-
clude the use of offensive [nonmutual issue preclusion], but to
grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should
be applied."3 3 The Court qualified its rule and declared that
27 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464 ("On this foundation, the
Court built an opinion to abandon a strict mutuality requirement that could easily
be limited to the setting of patent litigation.... Nonetheless, the opinion paved the
way for the wholesale rejection that quickly followed, first in lower courts and then
in the Supreme Court itself.").
28 Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 324 ("Many state and federal courts rejected
the mutuality requirement, especially where the prior judgment was invoked de-
fensively in a second action against a plaintiff bringing suit on an issue he liti-
gated and lost as plaintiff in a prior action .... The federal courts found Bernhard
persuasive.") (footnotes omitted).
29 See id. at 332 ("Even conceding the extreme intricacy of some patent cases,
we should keep firmly in mind that we are considering the situation where the
patentee was plaintiff in the prior suit and chose to litigate at that time and place.
Presumably he was prepared to litigate and to litigate to the finish against the
defendant there involved.").
30 See id. at 329 ("Although neither judges, the parties, nor the adversary
system performs perfectly in all cases, the requirement of determining whether
the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate is a most significant safeguard.").
31 439 U.S. 322 (1979). In the first lawsuit, the SEC sought injunctive relief
and successfully sued Parklane for a materially false and misleading statement in
connection with a merger. Subsequently, in a private stockholder's class action
against Parklane, the judgment in favor of the SEC was held available against
Parklane. Id. at 322-25.
32 See supra note 9.
33 Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 331.
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the doctrine should be unavailable in "cases where a plaintiff
could easily have joined in the earlier action or where ... the
application of offensive [issue preclusion] would be unfair to a
defendant. "3
Although the Parklane decision implicated both offensive
and defensive issue preclusion, the Court distinguished the
two on grounds of judicial economy and implicit fairness.3 5
The Court noted that offensive use promotes less judicial econ-
omy because it incentives plaintiffs to sue defendants individu-
ally.3 6 On fairness concerns under an offensive regime,
defendants in the second suit may have entirely more incentive
to litigate than the former parties, but the second-suit defend-
ants nonetheless are still bound.3 7 This is especially true
where a party in the first suit lacked strong incentive to litigate
because the award was nominal or future suits were unforesee-
able. The Supreme Court attempted to mitigate these risks by
granting broad discretion to trial courts.3 8
In the post-Parklane ra, both defensive and offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion are available options in federal litiga-
tion.3 9 However, the federal government's status as a party in
litigation complicates nonmutual issue preclusion's doctrinal
availability.4 0 While the doctrines are available for the federal
government o assert against private parties, the United States
Supreme Court held that offensive nonmutual issue preclusion
was unavailable against he federal government.4 1
C. Policy Rationale Behind Issue Preclusion
Understanding the policy rational behind issue preclusion,
more generally, provides a contextual understanding for Men-
dozds doctrinal exception. At its foundation, the doctrine of
issue preclusion prevents relitigation on the "principles of final-
34 Id.
35 See id. at 329-31.
36 See id. at 329-30 ("Thus defensive [issue preclusion] gives a plaintiff a
strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the first action if possible.
Offensive use of [issue preclusion], on the other hand, creates the precisely oppo-
site incentive.").
37 Id. at 330.
38 Id. at 331.
39 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464 ("As would be expected,
both defensive and offensive nonmutual [issue] preclusion have continued to be
available in federal case after the Parklane decision." (footnotes omitted)).
40 See ic § 4465.4.
41 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984).
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ity and repose."4 2 More specifically, its doctrinal emphasis on
finality is intended to promote issue preclusions' twin goals of
fairness and judicial economy.43 If anything, consistency be-
tween judgments promotes faith in our judicial system and the
structural integrity needed to avoid inconsistent answers to the
same question."
Fairness concerns address the notion of avoiding repetitive
litigation, promoting reliance interests, and avoiding unsavory
litigation tactics.4 5 In fact, "[tihe central role of adversary litiga-
tion in our society is to provide binding answers."4 6 Fairness
considerations also encompass reliance interests. Legal judg-
ments are of little value to litigants without systematic reliance
on that judgment.4 7 Without systematic reliance on a judg-
ment, a large void would encourage a litigant to relitigate any
adverse finding against the same party. Consequently, a key
purpose of issue preclusion is to assure litigants of the reliabil-
ity of their judgment, as they prepare for life after litigation. As
a corollary, the inability to relitigate prevents the risk of incon-
sistent judgments,4 8 which also entails various enforcement
issues.4 9 Relatedly, res judicata aims to "free people from the
uncertain prospect of litigation, with all its costs to emotional
peace and the ordering of future affairs. Repose is the most
important product of res judicata."5 0 Repose also limits legal
expenditures by protecting the outcome of litigation. In private
litigation, fairness concerns are most asymmetrical when fac-
ing a wealthy, litigious adversary, who is prepared to endlessly
litigate.51
42 See Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320,
1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4402).
43 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4416.
44 See Kevin M. Clermont, Res Judicata As Requisite for Justice, 68 RUTGERS
U. L. REV. 1067, 1115-16 (2016).
45 See id. at 1091 ("The policies of procedural fairness support the use of
[issue preclusion] to avoid the burdens of repetitive litigation on the party invok-
ing the doctrine, to avoid infringing on reliance interests, and to avoid the possi-
bility of the other party's causing renewed litigation or profiting from sneaky or
otherwise undesirable litigation tactics.").
46 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4403.
47 See id.
48 See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 154 (1979) (describing
that res judicata, which entails issue preclusion, "fosters reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions").
49 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4405.
50 Id. § 4403.
51 See Robert Ziff, For One Litigant's Sole Relief Unforeseeable Preclusion and
the Second Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 905, 912 (1992).
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Issue preclusion's additional aim, judicial economy, entails
more than mere resourcefulness-it promotes stability.5 2 No-
tably, the "true efficiency benefit . . . is the reallocation of legal
resources away from cases that can be resolved through pre-
clusion."5 3 In other words, the maximum benefits of judicial
economy are realized when resources which would otherwise
be required for litigation are allotted elsewhere. Where a liti-
gant had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate," issue preclu-
sion reduces litigation costs by prohibiting a litigant from
contesting an issue he lost in a previous proceeding.5' This
"full and fair opportunity to litigate" requirement furthers pre-
clusion's efficiency goals by ensuring due process5 5 and that
the "past proceeding[] [was] sufficiently rigorous to make the
subsequent court doubt that it will have a better opportunity to
discover the truth of the matter."5 6
Alternatively, motions for preclusion entail inherent costs.
By definition, the doctrine is administered only after inquiries
into the previous litigation, which, of course, entail monetary
expenditures.57 For issue preclusion to apply, a court must
determine whether the previous issue was actually litigated
after a full and fair opportunity;5 8 whether the issue was actu-
ally decided by a final, valid judgment on the merits;59 whether
52 See Clermont, supra note 44, at 1091 ("Society also has an interest in
avoiding any increase of uncertainty in the primary conduct of private and public
life outside the courtroom, as well as in reducing instability in the judicial branch
of the legal system. Efficiency argues for achieving the certainty and stability of
repose. Society has an interest in avoiding possibly inconsistent adjudications,
which at the least would erode faith in the system of justice.").
53 Ziff, supra note 51, at 914.
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS: FORMER ADJUDICATION § 29 (AM. LAw
INST. 1980).
55 See Ziff, supra note 51, at 916.
56 Id. at 916-17.
57 See, e.g., Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d
530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing the availability of claim preclusion).
58 See LaFleur v. Teen Help, 342 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2003) ("We are
presented with no evidence that the issue was fully and fairly litigated in another
case, so we decline to apply [issue preclusion]."); Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 563 F.2d 1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting there is no
preclusion of an issue that "was not actually litigated.").
59 SeeBrown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979) ("Whereas resjudicata
forecloses all that which might have been litigated previously, [issue preclusion]
treats as final only those questions actually and necessarily decided in a prior
suit."); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) ("Under collateral
estoppel, once an issue is actually and necessarily determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent
suits .. . .").
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it was necessary to decide the issue;6 0 and, formalistically,
whether the issues are the same.6 1
I
DOCTRINAL ACCOMMODATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IN CIVIL LITIGATION
This Part summarizes the doctrinal implications of the fed-
eral government's involvement as a party in civil litigation.
This Note's central concern is the availability of defensive non-
mutual issue preclusion against the federal government. How-
ever, it is important to understand how defensive mutual
(Stauffer Chemical Co.) and offensive nonmutual (Mendoza) is-
sue preclusion apply against the federal government. Both in-
form this Note's defensive nonmutual analysis. Subpart B will
provide state and circuit court decisions for additional context.
A. Doctrinal Clarification
When the United States is a party-litigant, the difference
between mutual and nonmutual designation has significant
doctrinal consequences.62 To better understand this Note's ar-
gument, it is important to discern how the Court treats this
distinction. In United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., the
United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of defen-
sive mutual issue preclusion was available against the federal
government. In Stauffer's companion case, United States v.
Mendoza, the Court alternatively held that offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion was unavailable against the federal
government.
60 See Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 835 (2009) ("A determination ranks as
necessary or essential only when the final outcome hinges on it." (quoting 18
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4421
(2d ed. 1988))); Block v. Bourbon Cty. Comm'rs, 99 U.S. 686, 693 (1878) ("Now
that a judgment in a suit between two parties is conclusive in any other suit
between them, or their privies, of every matter that was decided therein, and that
was essential to the decision made, is a doctrine too familiar to need citation of
authorities in its support. A few cases go farther, and rule that it is conclusive of
matters incidentally cognizable, if they were in fact decided. To this we do not
assent. But it is certain that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is
everywhere conclusive evidence of every fact upon which it must necessarily have
been founded.").
61 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4417-21.
62 Compare United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984)
(holding that the doctrine of defensive mutual issue preclusion is available against
the government), with United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1984)
(holding that the doctrine of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion was unavaila-
ble against the federal government).
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In Stauffer Chemical Co., the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) sought to hold Stauffer Chemical Company in
contempt for refusal to permit an inspection under the Clean
Air Act.63 The United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Tennessee dismissed the contempt citation, without
nullifying an administrative warrant, so then Stauffer ap-
pealed. The Sixth Circuit reversed judgment and the govern-
ment brought certiorari. On appeal, Stauffer argued that the
contractors were not "authorized representatives" under the
Clean Air Act for inspection purposes. Stauffer had used this
same argument in a similar case from Wyoming, involving the
same parties.64 In that case, the Tenth Circuit eventually held
the parties were not "authorized representatives."65 In the sec-
ond case, the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately
held that defensive mutual issue preclusion was available
against the Government to preclude relitigation on this issue.6 6
The Court relied on principles of judicial economy6 7 and
protecting litigants from the burdens of relitigation.6 8 Notably,
Stauffer Chemical Co. involved the same defendants-unlike
our SEC example.6 9 The government provided various argu-
ments for overriding concerns of judicial economy in favor of
applying an exception and prohibiting defensive issue preclu-
sion against the federal government.
First, the government argued-as it did in Mendoza-that
applying issue preclusion against the government will freeze
development of the law, as the government often litigates reoc-
curring issues of public importance.70 The Court dismissed
this argument by noting that "[the government's] argument is
persuasive only to prevent the application of [issue preclusion]
. . . in the absence of mutuality."7 ' The Court believed the
government's policy argument was attenuated in this context
63 See Stauffer Chen. Co., 464 U.S. 167.
64 See id. at 168.
65 See id.
66 See id. at 174.
67 See id. at 172 ("lW]e think that there is no reason to apply [an exception]
here to allow the Government to litigate twice with the same party an issue arising
in both cases from virtually identical facts.").
68 See id. ("Indeed we think that applying an exception to the doctrine of
mutual defensive [issue preclusion] in this case would substantially frustrate the
doctrine's purpose of protecting litigants from burdensome relitigation and of
promoting judicial economy.").
69 See supra Abstract.




because the EPA would otherwise litigate "the same issue aris-
ing under virtually identical facts against the same party."72
Next, the government argued that because the EPA is a
federal agency charged with administering specific laws nation-
wide, issue preclusion would require it to apply different rules
to similarly situated parties.7 3 In other words, the EPA's posi-
tion would result in inequitable administration of the law. The
EPA argued that if relitigation was foreclosed, Stauffer chemi-
cal plants in the Ninth Circuit would benefit from a rule that
precludes inspections by private contractors, while Stauffer's
competitors-also in the Ninth Circuit-would be subject to a
contrary rule. Notably, the Court declined to express an opin-
ion on this argument.7 4
Additionally, the government contended that the possibility
of binding future litigation would influence the Solicitor Gen-
eral to "appeal or seek certiorari from adverse decisions when
such action would otherwise be unwarranted."75 However, a
contextual understanding is implicit in the Court's response.
The Court-and the government-noted that "thousands of
businesses are affected each year by the question of contractor
participation in [the Clean Air Act inspector qualification sec-
tion]." 76 Therefore, the Court concluded, the government's
concerns were unrealistic because there were thousands of
other affected parties against whom the government could still
litigate. Thus, issue preclusion, as constrained by mutuality,
is an important distinction the Court acknowledged.7 7
Alternatively, the Court reached a different conclusion in
Mendoza. Here, the Court found an exception to offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion: the doctrine is unavailable against
the federal government.7 8 In Mendoza, the Court dealt with a
Filipino national who petitioned for naturalization under the
Nationality Act of 1940 based on his service in the United
States Army during World War II. While the naturalization
examiner recommended enying the petition, the federal dis-
trict court granted it without reaching the merits of Mendoza's
constitutional claim. The court held that the government was
72 See id.
73 See id. at 174.
74 See id. ("Following our usual practice of deciding no more than is necessary
to dispose of the case before us, we express no opinion on that application of
[issue preclusion].").
75 See id. at 173 n.6.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 172-73.
78 See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984).
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precluded from litigating the constitutional issues because of
an earlier, unappealed federal district court decision against
the government from other Filipino nationals. While the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, the Supreme Court of the United States ulti-
mately held that parties may not offensively preclude7 9 the
United States from litigating issues already determinedo in
prior government litigation.8 1
As a fundamental matter, the Court concluded that "[tihe
conduct of Government litigation in the federal courts is suffi-
ciently different from the conduct of private civil litigation ...
so that what might otherwise be economy interests underlying
a broad application of nonmutual [issue preclusion] are out-
weighed by the constraints which peculiarly affect the Govern-
ment."8 2 In particular, given "the nature of the issues the
government litigates" and "the geographic breadth of govern-
ment litigation," the government differs significantly from pri-
vate litigants.8 3
In rejecting Mendoza's arguments, the Court set forth six
specific policy arguments, justifying the government's exemp-
tion from offensive nonmutual preclusion. First, the federal
government is a party to a large number of cases across the
United States;8 4 second, government litigation often involves
legal questions of substantial public importance;8 5 third, non-
mutual issue preclusion against the government "would sub-
stantially thwart the development of important questions of law
by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
79 The action is classified as "offensive" because Mendoza wanted to apply the
adverse ruling against the government from another case into his current case
against the federal government. See id.
80 See In re Naturalization of 68 Filipino War Veterans, 406 F. Supp. 931, 934
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
81 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 154.
82 Id. at 163.
83 See i at 159.
84 Id. ("We have long recognized that 'the Government is not in a position
identical to that of a private litigant,' both because of the geographic breadth of
government litigation and also, most importantly, because of the nature of the
issues the government litigates. It is not open to serious dispute that the that the
government is a party to a far greater number of cases on a nationwide basis than
even the most litigious private entity . . . ." (citation omitted)).
85 Id. at 160 ("Government litigation frequently involves legal questions of
substantial public importance; indeed, because the proscriptions of the United
States Constitution are so generally directed at governmental action, many con-
stitutional questions can arise only in the context of litigation to which the govern-
ment is a party. Because of those facts the government is more likely than any
private party to be involved in lawsuits against different parties which nonetheless
involve the same legal issues.").
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issue";8 6 fourth, nonmutual issue preclusion would mandate
that the Solicitor General appeal every adverse decision to
avoid foreclosing further review;8 7 fifth, nonmutual issue pre-
clusion would obstruct the executive branch's ability to adopt
different positions on the law;8 8 and sixth, the Court was con-
cerned about the Ninth Circuit's approach.8 9 More specifically,
the Court ruled the Ninth Circuit's approach to nonmutual
issue preclusion against the government was unfair, given the
uncertainty in determining whether a court will bar relitigation
of the issue-and subsequent uncertainty on whether or not to
appeal an adverse decision.9 0
86 Id. ("A rule allowing nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government
in such cases would substantially thwart the development of important questions
of law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue.
Allowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it
receives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question
before this Court grants certiorari. . .. Indeed, if nonmutual [issue preclusion]
were routinely applied against the government, this Court would have to revise its
practice of waiting for a conflict to develop before granting the government's
petitions for certiorari.").
87 Id. at 160-61 ("The Solicitor General's policy for determining when to ap-
peal an adverse decision would also require substantial revision. The Court of
Appeals faulted the government in this case for failing to appeal a decision that it
now contends is erroneous. . . . But the government's litigation conduct in a case
is apt to differ from that of a private litigant. Unlike a private litigant who gener-
ally does not forego an appeal if he believes that he can prevail, the Solicitor
General considers a variety of factors, such as the limited resources of the govern-
ment and the crowded dockets of the courts, before authorizing an appeal.... The
application of [issue preclusion] against the government would force the Solicitor
General to abandon those prudential concerns and to appeal every adverse deci-
sion in order to avoid foreclosing further review." (footnote omitted)).
88 Id. at 161 ("In addition to those institutional concerns traditionally consid-
ered by the Solicitor General, the panoply of important public issues raised in
governmental itigation may quite properly lead successive Administrations of the
Executive Branch to take differing positions with respect to the resolution of a
particular issue. while the Executive Branch must of course defer to the Judicial
Branch for final resolution of questions of constitutional law, the former nonethe-
less controls the progress of government litigation through the federal courts. It
would be idle to pretend that the conduct of government litigation in all its myriad
features, from the decision to file a complaint in the United States District Court
to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of
Appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which involves no policy choices
whatever.").
89 See id. at 162.
90 Id. ("The Court of Appeals did not endorse a routine application of non-
mutual collateral estoppel against the government, because it recognized that the
government does litigate issues of far-reaching national significance which in
some cases, it concluded, might warrant relitigation. But in this case it found no
'record evidence' indicating that there was a 'crucial need' in the administration of
the immigration laws for a redetermination of the due process question decided in
68 Filipinos and presented again in this case. The Court of Appeals did not make
clear what sort of 'record evidence' would have satisfied it that there was a 'crucial
need' for redetermination of the question in this case . . . we believe that the
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B. Circuit and State Court Determinations
The law post-Mendoza is relatively clear: the federal gov-
ernment is exempt from litigants asserting offensive non-
mutual issue preclusion against it. As this Note acknowledges,
the Supreme Court has never addressed whether defensive
nonmutual issue preclusion is available. However, various fed-
eral circuit courts have addressed the issue.9 1
In Reich v. D.C. Wiring, Inc., the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey determined that defensive
nonmutual issue preclusion was unavailable against the fed-
eral government.92 More specifically, the court directly ex-
tended Mendoza's policy rationale to the defensive context.93
Contemporaneously, the court acknowledged the key differ-
ences between mutual and nonmutual issue preclusion.9 4
How the defendants presented the doctrinal issue to the court
is noteworthy. The defendants directly distinguished Men-
doza's "offensive" holding with their case's "defensive" issue,9 5
and the court rejected their argument categorically.9 6 The
standard announced by the Court of Appeals for determining when relitigation of
a legal issue is to be permitted is so wholly subjective that it affords no guidance to
the courts or to the government. Such a standard leaves the government at sea
because it can not possibly anticipate, in determining whether or not to appeal an
adverse decision, whether a court will bar relitigation of the issue in a later case.
By the time a court makes its subjective determination that an issue cannot be
relitigated, the government's appeal of the prior ruling of course would be un-
timely." (citation omitted)).
91 See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., Council 214, AFL-CIO v. Fed. Labor
Relations Auth., 835 F.2d 1458, 1462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (extending Mendozds
rationale to the defensive context and exempting the federal government); Reich v.
D.C. Wiring, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 105, 107 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding parties cannot
apply defensive nonmutual issue preclusion against the federal government).
92 Reich, 940 F. Supp. at 107-08.
93 Id. ("Although the facts of Mendoza naturally limited its holding to cases
involving nonmutual offensive [issue preclusion], lower courts, in interpreting this
holding, have generally concluded that its logic applies with equal force to cases
involving [defensive nonmutual issue preclusion]. . . . Thus, it is clear that the
government may not be bound by a prior litigation to which the instant defend-
ants were not a party, as the mere fact that the government is a plaintiff in this
case, as opposed to a defendant, does not alter the persuasive nature of the policy
articulated by the Supreme Court in Mendoza").
94 Id. at 108 ("[Defendant's concern about dealing with different standards in
different states] ignores the mutuality doctrine in that should defendants be suc-
cessful in this action in this forum, the government would then likely be estopped
from relitigating the issue on the basis of mutual defensive [issue preclusion].").
95 Id. at 106 ("In response, defendants argue that this is not a case of non-
mutual offensive [issue preclusion], but a case of nonmutual defensive [issue
preclusion], and therefore assert that Mendoza is distinguishable.").
96 See id. at 107..
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court also relied on other circuits that addressed the same
question and came to the same conclusion.9 7
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue.9 8 In
State of Idaho Potato Comm'n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc.,
the Ninth Circuit dealt with whether the defendant-through
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion-could bar a state
agency from relitigation the issue of whether a no-challenge
provision was enforceable in a breach of contract dispute.9 9
The court held that Mendoza's policy arguments apply to not
only defensive nonmutual issue preclusion but also against a
state government.100
In 2009, the Seventh Circuit held that defensive non-
mutual issue preclusion could not be applied against the gov-
ernment.10 In Kanter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a
Special Trial Judge (STJ) made initial factual determinations in
favor of the appellant.10 2 Later, the Tax Court overturned some
of the STJ's findings.103 Appellant then appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals.0 4 There he invoked defensive
nonmutual issue preclusion to estop the government from es-
tablishing liability against him by relitigating the factual deter-
minations the STJ found. In rejecting his argument, the
Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[tihe policy reasons for treating
the government differently, however, seem to us to be just as
powerful when applied to defensive preclusion."'0 5 While ad-
dressing the possibility that purely factual issues could be pre-
cluded, the court found it "more likely, however, that the
[Supreme Court] intended to create a uniform rule precluding
the use of the doctrine against the government."'0 6
97 See id. (acknowledging cases from the 11th Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
that also addressed whether nonmutual defensive issue preclusion applied
against the state or federal government, respectively, and concluded that it did
not).
98 See State of Idaho Potato Cormm'n v. G & T Terminal Packaging, Inc., 425
F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2005).
99 Id. Specifically, G & T wanted to prevent the state agency from challenging
the district court's determination that the no-challenge clause of the licensing
agreement was unenforceable.
100 Id. at 714 ("Mendoza's rationale applies with equal force to [the defendants]
attempt to assert nonmutual defensive [issue preclusion] against [a state
agency].").
101 See Kanter v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 590 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir.
2009).
102 Id. at 418-19.
103 Id. at 419.
104 Id. at 415.
105 Id. at 419.
106 Id. at 420.
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The Eleventh Circuit, only one year after Mendoza, ad-
dressed whether nonmutual issue preclusion could bar state
governments from relitigating issues.10 7 In Hercules Carriers,
Inc. v. Florida, the defendant tried to preclude Florida from
relitigating issues originating from a ship's allision that caused
over three dozen deaths.0 8 In denying its application, the
court addressed portions of Mendoza's policy arguments that
apply to state governments,0 9 while dismissing any substan-
tive distinctions between offensive and defensive uses.10
While the court did make a "critical" distinction from Men-
doza,111 the case represents the same jurisprudential trend
throughout federal circuits and states: defensive nonmutual
issue preclusion is unavailable against the government.112
II
EXTENDING Mendoza to Defensive Nonmutual Issue
Preclusion
A. Why Apply Mendoza
Before applying Mendozds arguments in the defensive con-
text, this Part will address the underlying assumption of why
Mendoza should apply despite the abundance of policy ratio-
nale in favor of issue preclusion.113 There are, after all, critics
107 See Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Claimant State of Fla., Dep't of Transp., 768
F.2d 1558, 1578 (11th Cir. 1985).
108 Id. at 1561-63.
109 Id. at 1580.
110 Id. at 1579 ("Nor do we see any substantive difference between nonmutual
offensive [issue preclusion] which the Supreme Court addressed and nonmutual
defensive [issue preclusion] . . ).
111 See id. at 1580 ("[The circumstances of this case present stronger reasons
than those present in Mendoza for not applying non-mutual collateral estoppel.
In Mendoza, the relevant government agency .. . was a party to both proceedings,
and in the second proceeding sought to litigate the identical issue involved in the
first proceeding.... [This case involves two wholly separate state agencies with
different interests and functions. The distinction is a critical one given the varied
interests a governmental body must pursue; if Mendoza stands for anything, it
must stand for the proposition that a government's agencies in pursuing their
stated goals must not be put in the untenable position of collaterally estopping
one another when they pursue the same issue for wholly different purposes.").
112 Some states, however, have declined to apply Mendoza to state govern-
ments, primarily based on the distinction between state and federal governments.
See Nornutual Issue Preclusion Against States, 109 HARv. L. REV. 792, 804 (1996)
("A cogent and thorough example is State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass'n .... The
court directly addressed Mendozds reasoning and cogently distinguished state
litigation from federal litigation.").
I13 See, e.g., A. Leo Levin & Susan M. Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the
United States Government, 70 IOwA L. REv. 113, 134 (1984) (arguing against Men-
dozds special exception and for application of issue preclusion against govern-
ment in order to prevent wasteful government relitigation).
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of Mendoza."4 It is important to note that, traditionally, courts
were more willing to grant defensive than offensive issue pre-
clusion.115 Consequently, critics may argue that Stauffer
Chemical Co.'s holding should extend doctrinally because, like
our SEC example and unlike Mendoza, it deals with defensive
applications of issue preclusion. After all, the Court in Stauffer
Chemical Co. addressed some of the same arguments from
Mendoza,1.6 while coming to a different conclusion.117
While that distinction is correct, it is simply not enough to
overcome the Mendoza policy arguments" 18 or issue preclu-
sion's doctrinal undercurrents. The mutual and nonmutual
distinction creates more doctrinal turbulence than the differ-
ence between offensive and defensive preclusion does.'1 9 It is
the mutual and nonmutual distinction that ultimately deter-
mines the scope of application. In other words, it categorically
determines who is precluded from relitigation (subject to ex-
ceptions). While inequity stemming from defensive or offensive
preclusion differs by a matter of degree, the mutual and non-
mutual distinction is what determines how far preclusion actu-
ally reaches. The mutual and nonmutual distinction operates
as a limiting or expanding principle which defines the exact
ambit of that preclusive determination. The extent that offen-
sive or defensive preclusion is problematic, in turn, depends on
how far it reaches. The influence of offensive or defensive ap-
plications is limited to the scope that the mutual and non-
mutual distinction sets for it. Consequently, the transition
from mutual to nonmutual does the heavy lifting in our doctri-
nal analysis.
The Court in Mendoza and Stauffer Chemical Co. also
treated the mutual and nonmutual distinction as dispositive.
The Court in Stauffer Chemical Co. put special emphasis on the
fact that its holding would prevent the government from "reliti-
gation of the same issue already litigated against the same
party in another case involving virtually identical facts."' 20
More specifically, the Court treated the difference between mu-
tual and nonmutual as authoritative by stating that an excep-
tion to preclusion is persuasive only "in the absence of
114 For a general critique of Mendoza, see Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunc-
tions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REv. 1 (2019).
I15 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464.
116 See supra Part I.
117 See United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 174 (1984).
118 See infra subpart II.B.
119 See 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4464.
120 See Stauffer Chern. Co., 464 U.S. at 165.
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mutuality."1 2 1 In Mendoza, the Court echoed its opinion in
Stauffer Chemical Co. and conceded that mutual preclusion
probably prevents the federal government from relitigation.12 2
Specifically, the Court stated that "[t]he concerns underlying
disapproval of [issue preclusion] against the government are for
the most part inapplicable where mutuality is present."123 The
Court distinguished its companion cases on the grounds of
mutuality-not offensive or defensive application.
With circuit courts also relying on Mendoza to defend an
exception for defensive nonmutual issue preclusion,124 Using
Stauffer Chemical Co. as a doctrinal reference point seems logi-
cally attenuated and doctrinally dissident. Subpart B of this
Part assumes the continuing validity of Mendozds arguments
and addresses how they logically extend from offensive to de-
fensive nonmutual issue preclusion.
B. Applying Mendoza
Recall Mendozds first policy argument: the federal govern-
ment is a party to a large number of cases across the United
States.1 2 5 In Mendoza, the Court noted that more than 75,000
of the 206,193 filings in the United States District Courts in-
volved the United States as a party.12 6 However, as critics may
argue, the percentage of cases in which the United States is
involved has declined from 1982.127 From June 30, 2017 to
June 30, 2018, the federal government was a party to 42,940 of
281,202 cases. While accurate, this argument requires a
deeper textual analysis of Mendoza. The Court in Mendoza was
not comparing the government's litigation numbers with that of
121 Id. at 166.
122 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 163-64 (1984) ("Today in a com-
panion case we hold that the government may be estopped under certain circum-
stances from relitigating a question when the parties to the two lawsuits are the
same.. .. The concerns underlying our disproval of [issue preclusion] against the
government are for the most part inapplicable where mutuality is present, as in
Stauffer Cemical .... The application of an estoppel when the government is
litigating the same issue with the same party avoids the problem of freezing the
development of the law because the government is still free to litigate that issue in
the future with some other party. And, where the parties are the same, estopping
the government spares a party that has already prevailed once from having to
relitigate-a function it would not serve in the present circumstances.").
123 Id.
124 See supra subpart I.B.
125 See supra Part I.
126 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
127 See Table C-I-U.S. District Courts-Civil Statistical Tables For The Federal
Judiciary (June 30, 2018), U.S. CTS. (June 30, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/




private litigation as a whole.1 2 8 Rather, the Court was compar-
ing the government with private, individual entities-specifi-
cally, the Court noted that it is "not open to serious dispute
that the government is a party to a far greater number of cases
on a nationwide basis than even the most litigious private en-
tity."I 29 Even with the overall decrease in government litiga-
tion, this logic undoubtedly holds today for both offensive and
defensive issue preclusion. For example, in our SEC hypotheti-
cal each company will conduct a cost-benefit analysis130 for
litigation "based on commercial business realities"13' to deter-
mine if continued litigation is viable, which is absent from the
government's decision-making process. Regardless of the litig-
ious nature of either company, the government is simply unfet-
tered by the commercial realities that limit private entities from
litigation. 132
The government deserves special treatment here. Of those
42,940 cases, any adverse factual determination against the
government could, theoretically, preclude it from relitigation
under a nonmutual regime. This presents the government with
a substantially higher risk of experiencing preclusive effects
than any single private litigant. Under a defensive nonmutual
regime this could limit the government from enforcing the law
against unrelated entities from any one of those 42,940 cases.
The next five policy reasons highlight why this numeric reality
is problematic.
Second, Mendoza's argument that government litigation
frequently involves legal questions of substantial public impor-
tance.3 3 logically extends to the defensive context.' 3 4 A textual
128 See supra note 84.
129 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 159.
130 See PATRICK J. FLINN, The Decision to Litigate, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIY CLAIMS & REMEDIES § 1.02 (1st ed. Supp. 2019) ("Lawsuits are expensive
and ... the costs of legal fees and expenses do not reflect the true cost of litigation.
Searching for and assisting in the production of documents, helping in fact inves-
tigation, serving as deponents, preparing trial witnesses, and participating in
settlement discussions absorb enormous amounts of time and energy. Usually
this time is extracted from the most valuable employees in the company-senior
executives, inventors, scientists, and key accounting personnel.").
131 Id.
132 See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
246-49 (2003).
133 See id. at 160.
134 This Note merely argues that the offensive versus defensive formalism is
not strong enough to limit Mendoza. Concededly, commentators note that not
every issue the government litigates is of great substantive importance. See, e.g.,
Levin & Leeson, supra note 113, at 113, 134 (arguing against Mendoza's special
exception and for application of issue preclusion against government in order to
prevent wasteful government relitigation).
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analysis of Mendoza supports this conclusion: the Court noted
that "because the proscriptions of the United States Constitu-
tion are so generally directed at governmental action, many
constitutional questions can arise only in the context of litiga-
tion to which the government is a party."1 35 Notably, the Court
made no distinction regarding how the government was a
party-whether a plaintiff or defendant. Even without consti-
tutional issues, the subject matter of a legal dispute retains the
possibility of public import irrespective of whether the govern-
ment is a plaintiff or defendant.13 6 The SEC, for example, can
regulate companies directly or reach the market indirectly
through individuals' 37-both of which entail the potential for
substantial egal importance. ' 3
This logic extends to issues of constitutional importance.
Imagine a situation where the Department of Justice sues the
Secretary of Education for State A-in her official capacity-for
failure to enforce the funding requirements under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The predicate issue, which is fully litigated
and determined, is racially discriminatory admission practices
of School B, within State A. Here, the government loses, and
then decides to sue School B directly (assuming it was not in
privity). As one can imagine, the lawsuit's consequences have
great implications on nonparties, too. Arguing the offensive
and defensive distinction as dispositive surely misses the
point-the government can litigate issues of substantial public
importance in either capacity. '3
135 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
136 Using our SEC hypothetical, the analytical classification as "defensive" or
"offensive" is entirely unrelated to the actual subject matter of the dispute.
137 See, e.g., Ann Maxey, SEC Enforcement Actions Against Securities Lawyers:
New Remedies vs. Old Policies, 22 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 537, 537 (1997) ("The SEC is
... concerned with the misconduct of the securities markets' principal players-
the lawyers' clients. By disciplining lawyers for failing to adhere to standards of
conduct that, in the SEC's view, are adequate, lawyers will have an incentive to
monitor and deter their clients' misconduct. Deterring violations protects the
investing public for whose benefit the securities laws were enacted. Lawyers, in
the SEC's view, can be required to participate in providing that protection because
lawyers owe a responsibility, if not a duty, to the investing public.").
138 While private litigants can bring securities actions, the government does so
with the intention of executing administrative policies that stem from the Execu-
tive. Courts should be more reluctant to stymie the enforcement policies of an
independent agency that litigates issues of substantial public importance pursu-
ant to Executive prerogative.
139 Similarly, in the context of our example, whether Company B is getting
sued by the government and wants to use a judgment (defensive preclusion), or is
suing the government and wants to use a judgment (offensive preclusion) has no
relation on the lawsuit's subject matter.
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Furthermore, mere exceptions to a general rule of non-
mutual issue preclusion applying against he government fail to
adequately protect this policy concern. For example, the Sec-
ond Restatement of Judgments calls for an exception where
"[tihere is a clear and convincing need for a new determination
. . . because of the potential adverse [effect] ... on the public
interest or the interests of [nonparties]."14 o However, the Re-
statement proceeds to describe these instances as "rare" and
that "litigation to establish an exception in a particular case
should not be encouraged."141 In the context of Mendozds sec-
ond policy concern, it seems incomplete for the government to
rely on an exception to a general rule whereby litigation to
establish that exception "should not be encouraged."
Third, the Court in Mendoza concluded that applying non-
mutual issue preclusion against the government would "sub-
stantially thwart the development of important questions of law
by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
issue."1 4 2 Here, it is more persuasive to distinguish the differ-
ences between mutual and nonmutual regimes.14 3 Under the
mutuality regime, questions of law may freeze, but they are
limited to the context of parties that are the same or in privity.
The government is free to litigate the same issue in the future
with other litigants. In the defensive versus offensive context,
this argument fails. Take our DOJ example: if any nonmutual
party could apply issue preclusion-for the issue of whether
School B employed racially discriminatory practices-that is-
sue is frozen on a broader scale and impacts more parties. This
reality survives the offensive versus defensive debate. Notably,
part of the Court's limiting principle in Stauffer Chemical Co.
was the ambit of mutuality, not the distinction between offen-
sive and defensive.'4 4
The same holds true for our SEC example. Let us assume
the SEC sues Company A on a new, potentially influential legal
theory. Under a mutuality regime, any judgment against the
SEC is strictly limited to those parties or privies, leaving open
the possibility for the SEC to further develop its legal theory
140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28, at para. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
141 Id. at cmt. g.
142 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984).
143 Cf United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 173 (1984).
'44 Id. ("[The argument against freezing the first final decision] is persuasive
only to prevent he application of collateral estoppel against the government in the
absence of mutuality. When estoppel is applied in a case where the government is
litigating the same issue arising under virtually identical facts against the same
party, as here, the government's argument loses its force.").
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against Company B. Intuitively, under a nonmutual regime,
the SEC is thwarted from further developing that theory be-
cause the factual judgment from its lawsuit against Company A
precludes relitigation in its lawsuit against Company B. Critics
may argue that the SEC can still develop law against new par-
ties for new issues. Analytically this is true, but this would
require the SEC to engage in a wait-and-see approach to de-
velop new areas of law when there would otherwise be a viable
option for litigation against Company B.
Fourth, the Court in Mendoza argued that nonmutual is-
sue preclusion would force the Solicitor General to change its
appeal policy and appeal every adverse decision to avoid fore-
closing further review.145 In the Court's view, nonmutual issue
preclusion would force the Solicitor General to forego pruden-
tial concerns. Critics may argue that in the defensive context,
because the government initiated litigation, it can better deter-
mine which issues to litigate-vitiating the concern that the
government would be forced to litigate issues it needs to ap-
peal. While this criticism may be true, it is incomplete. While
the government technically decided to bring litigation, there are
instances where the decision is more complicated.
Imagine, once again, our SEC example.146 Irrespective of
whether the SEC brought the first action against Company A,
the Solicitor General is still faced with the same determinations
the Court in Mendoza adumbrated.14 7 With the understanding
of potential litigation against Company B, the Solicitor Gen-
eral's determination to appeal remains intact. Whether the
SEC sued Company A or Company A sued the SEC, any ad-
verse decision for the SEC would incentivize the Commission to
appeal. Without an appeal, the SEC runs the risk of having
potential litigation against Company B precluded. In our ex-
ample, the Solicitor General's problem of overzealous appeal
procedures,148 when facing defensive preclusion, is commen-
surate with that of offensive preclusion. In a legal system
where defensive nonmutual issue preclusion is available
against the federal government, the analytical order of the ini-
tial litigation is a superficial concern.
145 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
146 See supra Abstract.
147 In other words: despite the SEC bringing its action against Company A, the
Solicitor General would still have incentive to appeal any issue that potentially
gives rise to another action the government wants to initiative.
148 The Attorney General has delegated discretionary authority to the Solicitor
General to determine when to appeal from a judgment adverse to the interests of
the United States. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (1982).
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Fifth, the Court in Mendoza argued that nonmutual issue
preclusion would obstruct the Executive Branch's ability to
adopt different positions on the law. More specifically, the
Court cautioned that "for the very reason that such policy
choices are made by one Administration, and often reevaluated
by another Administration, courts should be careful when they
seek to apply expanding rules of [issue preclusion] to govern-
ment litigation."14 9 The court in Mendoza addressed the exam-
ple whereby "in recommending to the Solicitor General in 1977
that the government's appeal in 68 Filipinos be withdrawn,
newly appointed INS Commissioner Castillo commented that
such a course 'would be in keeping with the policy of the [new]
Administration,' described as 'a course of compassion and
amnesty.'"
1 5 0
As a pragmatic reality, policy affects the judicial system;
the Court noted how "[ilt would be idle to pretend that the
conduct of government litigation in all its myriad features, from
the decision to file a complaint in the United States District
Court to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure
which involves no policy choices whatever."1 5 1 For our exam-
ple, assume under Administration 1 that the SEC sues Com-
pany A and the court renders a judgment in favor of Company
A. Administration 1 prioritizes the issue relatively low, and
they decided not to appeal. However, Administration 2 priori-
tizes that issue relatively high. Unfortunately for Administra-
tion 2, it is now stuck with the adverse ruling from
Administration 1 because Administration 1 did not appeal.
Under a regime of mutuality, Administration 2 cannot relitigate
the same issue against the same company, but it is free to
advance its administrative priorities through litigation against
separate and distinct parties.1 5 2 Although just one example,
the notion of changing administrations-and corollary devia-
tions in policy enforcement-is a pragmatic concern that non-
mutual preclusion cannot ameliorate.
Finally, the Court was especially concerned with the Ninth
Circuit's approach. The approach required a finding of "record
evidence" indicating that there was a "crucial need" for redeter-
mination of the issue.1 5 3 Notably, the Ninth Circuit failed to
149 Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 161.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See 18A Wright & Miller, supra note 3, § 4463.
153 See Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 162.
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delineate what type of "record evidence" is enough to satisfy a
"crucial need,"1 5 4 while acknowledging that the government lit-
igates issues of far-reaching national significance which might
warrant relitigation. The Court in Mendoza determined that
applying nonmutual issue preclusion against the government
under this approach is unfair, given the uncertainty in deter-
mining whether a court will bar relitigation of the issue and
subsequent uncertainty on whether or not to appeal an adverse
decision.
With the subjective nature of the Ninth Circuit's approach,
the government would lack any reliable indicia for when to
appeal adverse decisions. The "wholly subjective"155 test offers
little reassurance to ameliorate the Court's concerns of what
satisfies the "crucial need" standard. This is particularly im-
portant with government litigation because of the first 5 6 and
third'5 7 Mendoza policy arguments. This approach does little
to address the concern that the Solicitor General would need to
appeal every adverse decision. Without any reliable indicia for
the Solicitor General under this "wholly subjective" test, he is
left with the same appeal policy the Court cautioned against in
Mendoza. With the United States as a party to 42,940 cases, it
is simply impracticable for the Solicitor General to appeal every
adverse decision. Although potentially more acute under an
offensive regime, ' 5 these issues undoubtedly apply in the de-
fensive context. Under either regime, the Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach fails to adequately address Mendozds policy concerns.
CONCLUSION
With federal courts readily applying Mendoza's policy ratio-
nale to prevent offensive nonmutual issue preclusion against
the federal government, the doctrinal differences entailed in
defensive nonmutual issue preclusion are simply too attenu-
154 See id.
155 Id.
156 The federal government is a party to a large number of cases across the
United States.
157 The Solicitor General changing its appeal policy and appealing every ad-
verse decision to avoid foreclosing further review.
158 This concern is likely more acute in the offensive setting because the gov-
ernment cannot predict who will sue it in the future. By comparison, under the
defensive setting, the government is the party initiating litigation. In the defensive
context, the government would at least have the ex ante understanding that the
issue it wants to relitigate is facing a subjective judicial standard that remains
relatively obscure. The government could adequately prepare for that reality
before initiating litigation, unlike the circumstances it faces under an "offensive"
situation.
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ated to overcome Mendoza's policy arguments. For the struc-
tural integrity of the federal court system to remain intact post-
Mendoza, courts should reject rigid doctrinal inertia and, alter-
natively, should look at the practical considerations that war-
rant extending Mendoza's policy rationale to the defensive
context.
